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The broader picture
Britain’s role in the world
Stephen Whiteﬁeld: Colin, it is a great pleasure to be having
this conversation with you. e question of Britain’s place in the
world is not a new one, but it has particular salience in present
British, European and global circumstances. It strikes me that
there can seldom have been a moment in the past when answers
to this question were as poorly articulated and weakly held by
such a broad array of political forces, even in the midst of a ref-
erendum campaign. It also strikes me that you are just the
person to be asking. Your list of publications is full of appropri-
ate books and articles that come at the issue from many diﬀerent
angles. In 2013, on e Failure of Anglo-
Liberal Capitalism (Routledge); in 2015,
on e British Growth Crisis (Palgrave
Macmillan); in 2014, on e Legacy of
atcherism (Oxford University Press). I
could go on and on.
Let me start by asking you to put your-
self in context for our readers. Does the
issue of Britain’s role in the world matter
to you in any kind of visceral personal way? And how would you
say your academic and intellectual work to date engages with it?
Colin Hay: First, thank you Stephen. It is refreshing as a political
scientist to be asked about how the things one writes about
matter in a visceral and personal way. Of course they do, how -
ever much our professional lives lead us to have to hide that. In
fact, I suspect I don’t hide it very well! I now live in France and I
think of myself as European, British and Scottish. But I would
much prefer not to have to place those self-identiﬁcations in
some kind of hierarchical order – nor, worse still, to have to
choose between them.
So it concerns me greatly – indeed, viscerally – that British
politics seems, with each passing day, to make it more and more
diﬃcult to be European, British and Scottish with ease, without
compromise and without managing a complex array of growing
tensions. I worry greatly about the possibility of Brexit – which,
I think, is a very real threat. And I worry about it not because I
think that a majority of British citizens wish for it, but because
diﬀerential turnout levels eﬀectively magnify the inﬂuence of
those socio-economic groups that are both most Eurosceptic in
their views and most likely to vote.
But I also worry about Britain’s place in the world in a broader
sense – and have done so for longer. As a political economist it
strikes me that Britain and the US share, if not an enduring spe-
cial relationship (that would seem to be over), but a certain spe-
cial responsibility for the Anglo-liberal character of the
capitalism that led to the edge of the precipice in 2008. ose
concerns endure today, not least because we do not appear to
have moved very far from that precipice since 2008 (in part
because we have not taken the responsibility seriously) – and
the drop, now that we have been staring into the abyss for a
while, looks very scary indeed.
SW: at opens a lot to discuss. Obviously, there is also a long
narrative about national decline, and then revival most recently
in the atcher period, hardly rejected by Blair. As you say, the
dominant ideology in the UK bears much
responsibility for the form of Anglo-
American capitalism that for much of the
period especially from the end of the
Cold War to the ﬁnancial crisis we
worked to export. But it seems to me that
there are very few now even in the Tory
party who evangelise for it, far less wish
the UK to take the lead in reforming the
EU in that direction. Rather, even if we stay in, leave the conti-
nent to its own devices – I worry deeply about the consequences
of that for Europe.
But can we start by looking further back historically than the
rise of atcherism or the end of the Cold War? I suppose there
has never been political agreement on what Britain’s place in the
world should be. But on left and right and around the UK, can we
say at least that there have been strong and coherent competing
narratives that went with a sense of the country’s great impor-
tance in and for the world? With a broad brush, how would you
characterise them?
CH: at’s diﬃcult and I would not claim to be any sort of
authority on these more historical issues. But you pose a fasci-
nating question and one not asked enough, I think. What strikes
me, reﬂecting on it now, is that Britain’s projection of its place in
the world today is a more frightened and timid one than it has
perhaps ever been. at this is so is almost certainly in part a
consequence of a much more diminished and fragile sense of
Britishness itself. It is no longer clear what Britain or British
identity is that one might project beyond Britain’s shores;
indeed, it is not clear that there exists a sense of Britishness
capable of uniting those living within its shores. Brexit and the
possibility of a second Scottish independence referendum after-
wards are a manifestation of that wider anxiety and all of that, in
turn, when set in a wider historical context can be seen as the
latest episode of the story of Britain’s long decline.
Britain and the US share a
certain special responsibility for
the Anglo-liberal character of
the capitalism that led to the
edge of the precipice in 2008
Stephen Whiteﬁeld talks to Colin Hay about Britain’s
projection of its place in the world today, set in the context
of the diminished sense of Britishness and the story of the
long decline of the country itself
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But what also strikes me is that, in the process of losing its
sense of identity and the conﬁdence to project whatever identity
it did have internationally, Britain has gone in eﬀect from being
some kind of global public good provider (at times in a rather
claustrophobically paternalistic way) to a much more simple
exponent and proselytiser for market liberalism. at was cer-
tainly not the case under atcher – whose neo-conservatism
was just as important as her neo-liberalism in determining her
sense of Britain’s place in the world. But it
does appear to be the story since
atcher. In a way, Britain’s long-stand-
ing (market) liberalism has always been
tempered by other things – conser-
vatism, paternalism, even a certain ethi-
cal socialism on occasions. Today it is
seems strangely untempered.
SW: Well, and as I say, even that we seem
to do more timidly. Cameron carves out a special deal for the
City but we hardly hear anyone these days promising that
Britain will lead a coalition of the anti-bureaucratic, anti-regu-
latory forces of Europe for a new EU. We are close to signing up
to TTIP but the old arguments of the beneﬁts of trade liberalisa-
tion are not being made in its support. So, if we are left with
nothing but market liberalism to underpin our narrative about
Britain’s place in the world, we are without much being said at
all to legitimate what we do or don’t do.
Yet, of course, we continue to project military power and
“punch above our weight”. But is there a new argument for all
that – and about all that – beginning to emerge in the post-crash
world when other – if related – issues have become more
salient?: climate change; migration; war, terrorism, security.
ere is plenty of denial and drawing up the drawbridges of
narrow nationalism in response to these challenges. But it
seems to me that no political forces – right, left or centre – in
Britain as yet seem to have put together a successful response
that has an internationalist core and which projects Britain’s
undoubted power on many dimensions – economic, military,
cultural – to provide global leadership. I wonder why that is,
especially for the left – supposing it is true. Is it because of the
nature of the issues themselves? Because the centre-left is so tar-
nished by its association with neo-liberalism not to mention
neo-conservatism that it has entirely lost a capacity to make
convincing arguments? But I also wonder what the contours of
an internationalist position that makes sense in responding to
these growing challenges and makes use of Britain’s undoubted
power in the world should look like? And where and how will
the case be made? I guess it is not going to be via our position to
inﬂuence the EU, even if we stay in it.
CH: Sadly, I think your analysis is depressingly accurate. Insofar
as Britain now has a consistent stance on an international stage
it is surely a combination of two things. e ﬁrst is the kind of
default market liberalism that we have been talking about. It
trumps, of course, practically every other consideration –
acting, for instance, as a veto on the kind of global governance
required to address climate change or ﬁnancial market re-regu-
lation in response to the crisis. e eﬀect is to turn Britain into
a global veto player (albeit one which now often lacks the power
to prove inﬂuential on its own). And the second is, of course,
parochial special pleading! is is the story of Cameron’s
attempt to re-negotiate Britain’s EU membership – the idea that
Britain, somehow, deserves to enjoy all the market-liberal bene-
ﬁts of European integration without suﬀering any of the costs or,
more importantly still, bearing any sense of collective responsi-
bility. It is not especially surprising that if
this is Britain’s stance on a European
stage, it is no longer either interested in
nor capable of projecting a positive and
internationalist presence on a wider
stage.
at a combination of national
parochialism and market liberalism
should come to deﬁne Britain’s stance on
a global stage is, of course, a dreadful
thing; that it should have come to have been accepted so timidly
by the centre and the left in British politics is a tragedy. But it is
not altogether surprising – and, for me, it has its origins in
Blair’s decision over Iraq. is was the moment when Labour, in
particular, stopped placing ethical considerations (however
conceived, however misconceived) above more narrowly instru-
mental imperatives. Liberal quietism is the new orthodoxy;
indeed, it is the new consensus.
SW: Let me come back again to the nature of these “new” issues
that now press because they seem to cut across both left and
right and may make it harder to ﬁnd a coherent way of thinking
about Britain’s role. On the right, forces of neo-liberalism retain
their power and wealth, are increasingly divided about climate
change – more and more of them see money-making opportu-
nities in new green technologies – but the consequences of the
wars they supported and the global economy they created have
overwhelmed their ideological defences. On the left, the dream
of pooled sovereignty to regulate capitalism and advance social
rights has been equally undermined. It seems to me that only
one political ﬁeld has emerged to make sense of all this with
growing menace. Populist authoritarianism – nationalist, anti-
migrant, welfarist so long as support is oﬀered to “our own
people”, but not so threatening to the powerful that they should
fear losing their wealth. is populist authoritarianism is taking
many forms across the globe and each of them oﬀers its own
deﬁnition of its country’s role in the world. Trumpism appears
to be a rejection of the neo-cons’ global reach and promises to
put America ﬁrst by cutting back on NATO and rejecting the
huge ediﬁce of post-War global trade. Putinism puts together
elements of Russia’s and Soviet pasts in a particularly toxic and
weird yet expedient brew of nationalism with an internationalist
dimension to deﬁne a place for Russia in the world today. Russia
as messianic state in defence of Christian values; Russia as inter-
national strongman, ready to act when the weak West now
cannot. We can get more parochial and inward looking with
Orban in Hungary where ideological battles are fought over
long-lost tribes in Transylvania. And of course you will feel this
very close to home in France with le Pen.
The broader picture
Is the centre-left so tarnished by
its association with
neo-liberalism not to mention
neo-conservatism that it has
entirely lost a capacity to make
convincing arguments?
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So, I want to ask you next about two things. First, can I just
get a comparative benchmark for the questions we ask about
Britain’s role in the world? You live and work now in Paris. Are
the French as concerned and confused about their role in the
world as we are? Is there something peculiarly British about
asking this issue? Or is this existential angst a global phenome-
non? And second, what do you make of the prospects for
authoritarian populism – that might not be the best term – in
Great Britain? And do narratives of Britain’s role in the world
look likely to strengthen its appeal in the way that national nar-
ratives appear to strengthen Putin or Orban or Kaczsynski?
CH: Interesting questions. Let’s take them in turn. First, the
French. I think this is exactly the right question – not least as it
changes the context and the perspective a little – just enough to
help us see what we might not otherwise see. Put bluntly, I feel
that I understand Britain better for no longer living in Britain
(the same was true when I lived in the US for a short time in the
late 1990s) – one can see certain things more clearly for not
being totally immersed within them. So
what does that change of perspective
oﬀer here? Well, ﬁrst, the French have
perhaps never sought to project their
power globally in the same way as the
British – well, not since Napoleon at
least! And, as this perhaps already suggests, they had less global
presence and less global pretension to lose! But the sense of a
vacuum where once there was something else is certainly less
pronounced (though I think it is still palpable and in that sense I
think you are right to speak in terms of a global sense of existen-
tial angst). But what is made clear by thinking about this in com-
parative terms is that, whatever their problems, the French (in
stark contrast to the British) have never really lacked a sense of
what they stand for – and a conﬁdence that they are right to
project what they stand for internationally. Here, of course, the
revolution – and the cathartic cleansing of the state that, in
eﬀect, it ushered in – is crucial. For the French revolution allows
the modern French state to present itself as some kind of bas-
tion of a progressive modernity – most notably in and through
the sense that it stands for the public good – the res publica. As
we know the notion of the republic (the collective or public
good) can cover a multitude of sins, but it is also exactly what
the contemporary question of global governance is all about …
and that gives the French an easier entry point in way – they
have a facility when it comes to discourses of this kind that the
British (with their historic preference for philanthropy and the
private, rather than public, provision of public goods) have
never really had.
And what about authoritarian populism? Again, the hunch
here is right, I think. Sadly, the time of authoritarian populism
seems to have come again – though a little like the relationship
between Blairism and atcherism before it, today’s authoritar-
ian populism (particularly in its more subtle incarnations) is
rather more sotto voce than in its earlier manifestation. To be
fair, that is not true of the authoritarian populism of Trump or
Putin or, indeed, Marine Le Pen; but it is true, I think (to date, at
least) of Cameron and Osborne, of Boris Johnson and even per-
haps of Nigel Farage. Yet this comparative quietism does not
make it any less invidious – not least because it makes it rather
more diﬃcult to see for what it really is. For, as the late great
Stuart Hall taught us all those years ago, authoritarian populism
is, in eﬀect, the hegemonic correlate of inequality – they go
together. When one abandons “one nation” politics and seeks,
instead, to make a political virtue of pitting the “haves” (who will
have more) against the “have nots” (who will have less) one
needs a series of rhetorical strategies for demonising the various
“losers” as “undeserving” and a political strategy for penalising
their moral fecklessness and, indeed, their resistance. at is
today’s resurgent authoritarian populism in a nutshell. Sadly it
is becoming more not less salient.
SW: Well, I don’t think I have ever felt as much political danger
– I would even say from the potential of fascism – in the midst
of political failure of our institutions in Britain and Europe and
everywhere else and in the face of so many pressing challenges
to our economies, societies and the planet. I do retain some ves-
tiges of dialectical hope in all this. Marx
said something like “humans never set
themselves questions that they cannot
answer” – though even if we were to stop
all carbon emissions tomorrow there is
apparently still enough CO2 in the atmos-
phere to slowly melt the icecaps. ings should still be ﬁne: we
have two thousand years to learn to breathe under water!
But let’s move to a conclusion if we can about the sorts of
forces and arguments that might be capable of dealing with
some of these challenges and about the kind of role we could
envisage for Britain in the world. We probably wouldn’t want to
start from here, but what’s the best we can do given where we
are. Corbynism? e Green Party? A progressive Scottish
nationalism? e revival of a centre-left in the UK as a whole? In
grassroots movements? In the re-establishment of the authority
of scientiﬁc and pro-science elites, as Mill might have argued
about the spirit of this age?
And what could Britain uniquely contribute internationally to
making a better global order? I suppose there is considerable
recent history of tolerance, including multiculturalism as con-
tested as that of course is. We have just about got the rule of law
and constitutionalism, including civilian control of the military.
Our nations live together in one state and we even have civilised
and democratic processes to adjudicate over separation. ere
are the vestiges of the ethical socialism you referred to earlier.
We have a huge economy, military and great cultural reach. e
world increasingly speaks our language – even in France these
days. We are a democracy, if not a republic. Surely, a sensible
and attractive and achievable role for Britain in the world can be
made from these building blocks?
CH: Ah yes, dialectics! When it is really, really bad we can always
put our faith in those – and, in a sense, we have to. But the argu-
ment, such as it is, always seems to me at least to be little more
than the suggestion that it can’t carry on getting worse forever.
In a way, it’s little more than an optimistic spin on pessimism.
But based on our rather bleak conversation up until this point
What could Britain uniquely
contribute internationally to
making a better global order?
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(sorry!) it would appear to be all that we have. And in a sense,
too, that is right and perhaps shouldn’t surprise us. In fact, when
I go looking for optimism the thought I run through my head is
that Keynesianism was not born (and certainly not implement-
ed) in the decade of the Great Depression itself; similarly, if we
see neo-liberalism as the (eventual) product of the crisis of the
1970s, it was not until at least the mid 1980s when things were
really discernibly and irreversibly neo-liberal. at suggests that
we need to be just a little more patient – that history’s wheel
takes a little longer to turn and what leads
it to turn is the capacity of political elites
to test to destruction the paradigm that
deﬁnes their worldview. Our pessimism,
it strikes me, is a product of witnessing
the testing to destruction of the neo-lib-
eral paradigm. at, of course, is not a
very edifying spectacle. But it does con-
tain within it the seeds of a little opti-
mism.
Of course, I may be wrong, and in a
way (dare I say it) this may be too opti-
mistic. Because what takes us ultimately
from one paradigm to the next is not the
degree of devastation wreaked by the dis-
integration of the old, but the presence of a credible new para-
digm. And that’s the really depressing part. Corbynism is no
alternative paradigm; indeed, Corbynomics is practically non-
existent. Indeed, that is what depresses me most about the
British context at present – the seeming incapacity of any of the
major political parties to contemplate an alternative to the
Anglo-liberal growth model and the inexorable ratcheting up of
inequality with which it continues to be associated. I do not
think Corbyn will endure as Labour leader – and one of the rea-
sons for that is that his seeming radicalism does not extend to
economic policy. But if I am honest, I struggle to identify the
carriers of a new economic paradigm in any British political
party. In part, though, this is to look in the wrong direction.
For there is, in fact, a very strong argument for the suggestion
that any such credible new economic paradigm needs to be pro-
jected not domestically but internationally and that the transi-
tion to post-neo-liberalism needs to be co-ordinated
internationally and embedded institutionally at a global level.
at makes a great deal of sense to me – but it hardly makes the
task any easier; nor does it bring its realisation any closer.
SW: ank you Colin. We are colleagues and friends and that
certainly is no guarantee of even mild agreement. But here we
are, agreeing largely about the problems and their causes, equal-
ly without a motor force in history that might help address
them, and having a conversation to a magazine of the democrat-
ic left in Scotland where hope must surely still well up. So, let’s
engage in some self-criticism at the end. Fascism is possible, the
ice caps will melt. But let’s say we wanted to deﬁne a research
project to test that we were wrong, that political forces are
indeed emerging that could build an alliance for a Britain that
would make Britain play a leading role in a progressive world.
We have colleagues – and friends – who do indeed do such
research. What kind of project would it be? Perhaps on the
internet? Perhaps on the sharing economy?
CH: Ah, that’s easy. ough I suspect my answer might surprise
you. I think we need to know far far more about how the young
think about politics and how, above all, that sense of enthusiasm
and excitement and optimism that they all seem to have when
they are really young that our world can be made a better place
is somehow squeezed out of them. I think what we would ﬁnd
would be that they do indeed have this
almost natural (and naturally progres-
sive) sense of politics but that they start
to lose it (particularly if they are educated
in Britain) when they start to label it, and
other things too, as “political”. I think that
is a tragedy. We need to encourage our
youngsters to be creative optimists and to
think collectively and responsibly of and
about the futures they wish to forge – and
we need to encourage them to think that
this is politics and that politics is a good
and a necessary thing, not something to
be ashamed of and to wish for as little of
as is humanly possible. at politics is
their capacity, in the end, to forge a world better than the one
that we have forged for them – a world they can be proud of and
that can be a better legacy for their children than the one we
bequeath them.
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